This is the joint work of several people of whom only Joe-Kai is here today. The whole work is still open research and, as the title indicates, aims to facilitate the secure and efficient usage of non-standard crypto primitives, especially for software engineers.
if you are able to compose the implementation and the design it's still timeconsuming because as soon as you do a tiny change to the proof goal, you must start again from the very beginning. Now the third problem is related to the last one, it's about the security of the implementation itself. You should avoid insecurities in the implementation, so the C code, for example, should avoid buffer overflows, etc. (and it should be optimised for a given architecture).
And the very last challenge from our point of view, is the reputation of the protocols. I mean, you can write down a C program and say that it realises a given proof goal, but it's not easy to formally prove that the program implements this proof goal. Especially if you are a non-expert you would have a quite hard time and if you are an expert on the subject then it's at least very time-consuming and a bit boring.
So the question is, is it possible to optimise the whole idea, and that's our approach, we want to build a compiler that takes an abstract description of the proof goal as an input, and output three parts. The first part is the C, or Java implementation of the given proof goal. The second part is a documentation, and the third one is formal proof, that this implementation really realises the proof goal.
Well let's look at this zero-knowledge compiler box a bit closer. The user will give a high level description of the proof goal, and the first step, the proof techniques will be chosen and the protocols will be defined for the proof goal, and the protocol specification will be output, that's an abstract description, which describes a unique protocol but abstracts away all the information that's not really relevant. Then the protocol compiler compiles this protocol specification to C or Java code, or whatever. And both parts of the compiler will add annotations to the code containing information about group orders, or whatever information is known to the prover, if this information is known to the verifier. Now this information will go into protocol verification, which is based on the prover, and will hopefully output the formal proof of the correctness of this implementation.
At the moment we have the protocol compiler more or less done, the high-level compiler is only started, it's under construction, and for the protocol verification toolbox we are currently thinking how to automise the proofs.
At the beginning I said something about the mission of this project. At the moment if you are a software engineer and you think about the cryptographic primitives you might use for implementation you think of hash functions, of signature schemes, of encryption schemes, and essentially that's it. The goal of the project is to enrich this by zero-knowledge proof of knowledge. Sören Preibusch: It seems then to me the limits of the protocol design will be the expressiveness of the high-level specification language that the compiler can handle.
Reply: Exactly.
Sören Preibusch: So if you want a not-off-the-shelf protocol then you can't use your compiler.
